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The paper outlines the basic issues arising from the rules on the right of estab-
lishment in the European Union and discusses to what extent those rules enable 
companies to change their seat. The seat of the company is crucial for determining the 
substantive law which applies to the company. The substantive law may be either the 
law of the registered seat or the law of the real seat of the company. Confl ict of laws 
rules in various countries are different as to the determination of the substantive law, 
depending on whether that law applies real seat or registered seat theory. Any company 
and its members are interested that the applicable substantive law is favourable to 
the company, its members and its business. The open question is, however, to what 
extent they are free to choose that law, by choosing the place of incorporation and/or 
by moving the seat of the company from one country to the other. 
Key words: right of establishment, seat of company, transfer of seat, cross-border 
transfer of seat, lex societatis
I. INTRODUCTION
The incentive for this paper was given by the recent ECJ ruling in Case 
Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt (hereinafter: CARTESIO)1 that was widely 
commented in legal literature.2 However, due to limits of this paper, the idea 
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1 C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt, ECR 2008, I-9641.
2 Bohrenkämper, J., Corporate Mobility across European Borders: Still no Freedom of 
Emigration for Companies?, European Law Reporter, 3/2009; de Sousa, A. F., Compa-
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only to provide an outline of issues which gave rise to CARTESIO, i.e. the right 
to transfer company seat within the Community (i.e. the issue that falls within 
the scope of corporate mobility). In order to do so, we will focus foremost on 
the general corporate mobility within the confl ict of laws context followed by a 
brief introduction of the two established but mutually divergent theories used 
by various jurisdiction (among other) for determination of applicable company 
law in corporate mobility cases. Thereafter, we will refer to corporate mobility 
within the context of Community law which unavoidably includes discussion 
on the intricate matter of the right to freedom of establishment. Finally, we 
will conclude this paper by referring to the work on the uniform Community 
level instrument that was to ensure adequate level of corporate mobility and 
thus company seat transfer within the Community. 
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND CORPORATE MOBILITY 
It is common knowledge that purely domestic legal relations are governed 
primarily by the national provisions of the jurisdiction concerned.3 However, 
in international situations this unanimous application of a national law of 
one jurisdiction becomes somewhat blurred. In such situations where there is 
more than one jurisdiction involved in regard to a certain legal situation (i.e. 
a situation with an international element), before resolving the dispute there 
is a need to determine which of the possible national law provisions would be 
applicable to the dispute concerned.4 If all of the competing national laws are 
to be applicable simultaneously to the same legal situation, the conjunction of 
ny’s Cross-border Transfer of Seat in the EU after Cartesio, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
07/09 (http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/, visited 10.9.2010.); BouËek, V., PejËiÊ, 
L., Presuda Cartesio i osobni statut trgovaËkog druπtva - (dis)kontinuitet sudske prakse 
Europskog suda, Hrvatska pravna revija 9 (2009) 10; Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., Com-
panies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ Cartesio Judgment, European Business 
Organization Law Review 10 (2009).
3 Notwithstanding the right of the parties to determine applicable law to their contractual 
relationship which can be different from the law of their country, however even in such 
situations the parties could not bypass application of mandatory rules applicable in their 
country. 
4 E.g. an international sales contract involving a seller and a buyer from different jurisdic-
tions or in the case of our interest a company intending to transfer its administrative seat 
from one jurisdiction to another. 
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these (generally) confl icting national laws would lead to contradictory results, 
legal uncertainty, ineffectiveness of legal protection and signifi cant problems 
in regard to enforcement of court rulings. Therefore, for regulating such situ-
ations a whole new area of private law developed, i.e. private international 
law.5 In order to determine which one of the competing national laws would 
be applicable to a certain legal situation private international law developed 
a legal term known as the connecting factor. Connecting factor represents a 
factual link that connects a certain person, entity or a legal relationship to a 
certain national legal order that is considered to be the closest to that person, 
entity or a legal relationship. In other words, connecting factor directs to the 
applicable law of a national legal order with whom a certain person, entity 
or a legal relationship has the closest connection. Connecting factors can be 
determined by international and national rules of law.6 
Since the topic of our paper relates to corporate mobility within the context 
of Community law, a preliminary question arises: What does corporate mobility 
actually mean? Generally speaking, corporate mobility represents a freedom of 
a company to conduct its business activities in a jurisdiction other than the one 
of its original incorporation as well as company’s right to choose a set of national 
company law rules that best suit its business needs.7 For example, corporate mobil-
ity would include situations where a company incorporated under one jurisdiction 
operates in another or where a company transfers from one jurisdiction to another 
and thus subjects itself to the company law of that other jurisdiction. 
Since international nature of corporate mobility concerns not one jurisdic-
tion but two or more (i.e. company conducts its business activities in several 
jurisdictions), private international law plays an important role and thus rep-
resents an area of our immediate interest.8 That is because such corporate mo-
5 The term private international law is a synonym to international private law and confl ict 
of laws. The usage of these terms generally depends on the legal order (e.g. common law 
legal orders usually use the term confl ict of laws). However, during this work we will 
interchangeably use both confl ict of laws and private international law in order to relate 
to the same concept. 
6 Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the Law Applicable to Traffi c Accidents as ex-
ample of international confl ict of laws instrument and Switzerland’s Bundesgesetz vom 
18. Dezember 1987 über das Internationale Privatrecht (IPRG) as an example of national 
confl ict of laws rules. 
7 Wyckaert, M., Jenné F., Corporate Mobility, unpublished, p. 4 (www.ssrn.com, visited 
10.9.2010.).
8 De Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 3.
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bility situations might result in legal issues for companies that could require 
application of confl ict of laws rule in order to determine applicable national 
company law provisions.9 However, determination of such applicable company 
law (i.e. lex societatis) in international context might not be as easy since there 
is more than one national jurisdiction involved whose confl ict of laws rules 
might not lead to application of the same lex societatis. This problem derives 
from application of diverging connecting factors by different jurisdictions which 
might eventually lead even to serious consequences for the company involved 
like the company’s termination.10
III. DETERMINATION OF LEX SOCIETATIS
In view of the above, private international law has seen two general but diverg-
ing theories being developed in regard to determination of lex societatis: (i) the 
registered seat theory and (ii) the real seat theory. Registered seat theory is usually 
native to common law legal order while the real seat theory is generally common 
to civil law legal orders.11 However, note that many jurisdictions today adopt one 
of these theories with certain specifi c distinctions which eventually make such 
private international law regulation in every jurisdiction unique.12 In other words, 
there are hardly two unique national legal orders in regard to the confl ict of laws 
9 Company laws are important because they provide a set of rules that regulate company’s 
establishment, organization, every day operation and termination. In other words, to 
resolve a certain company issue it is the applicable company law that will fi rst usually 
have to be determined and afterwards applied. 
10 Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 597; See also fn. 22 and the text follow-
ing chapter 4 Consequences of determining Lex Societatis. 
11 BarbiÊ, J., Pravo druπtava, Knjiga druga, Druπtva kapitala, Third Edition, Zagreb 2008, 
p. 378; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 4, 6.
12 For example Croatia acknowledges both the real seat and the registered seat as con-
necting factors. Specifi cally Croatian Company law in article 37 (4) provides that: “If 
the management board of a company is located at a place other than that place entered 
into the commercial register as the company’s seat [author’s comment: the administrative 
seat], or if the company performs its activities in a place other than place entered into 
the commercial register as the seat [author’s comment: the administrative seat], the place 
entered in the commercial register shall be regarded as the seat [author’s comment: the reg-
istered seat]…”. (Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia Nos. 111/93, 34/99, 121/99, 
118/03, 107/07, 146/08 and 137/09).
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rules on determination of lex societatis.13 Furthermore, each of these two theories 
relates to a different connecting factor for determination of lex societatis.
Registered seat theory purports that the applicable company law is the law 
of the country under whose law the company is registered / incorporated.14 
Specifi cally, the connecting factor being the country of company’s incorporation, 
i.e. where location of the company’s registered seat is located.15 Legal orders 
that adopt this theory regard companies that are incorporated under their law 
as companies that have their nationality.16 Having nationality of a legal order 
grounded in the registered seat theory means that a company cannot transfer 
its registered seat to another jurisdiction without losing nationality of that legal 
order.17 That is because such transfer would result in breaking the link with 
13 De Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 3, 9; Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 
621 - 622.
14 BarbiÊ, J., op. cit. in fn. 11., p. 378; Valk, O., C-210/06 Cartesio Increasing corporate 
mobility through outbound establishment, Utrecht Law Review 6 (2010) 1, p. 154, 164; 
Mucciarelli, F. M., Company ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail 
Revisited, European Business Organization Law Review 9 (2008), p. 283; Wyckaert, M., 
Jenné, F., op. cit. in fn. 7., p. 5; Registered seat theory is native to common law legal 
orders like UK, Ireland, USA and Netherlands. 
15 Registered seat (also referred to as registered offi ce) is the address of the company regis-
tered with the company register in the jurisdiction of company’s incorporation. In other 
words, registered seat represents an address which is registered with the government as 
the offi cial address of a company, an association or any other legal entity (also known 
as the seat of incorporation). This is the address where all the communication from the 
company register will be related to. The registered seat does not need to coincide with 
the place where company conducts its business or has its management; Szudockzy, R., 
How does the European Court of Justice Treat Precedents in its Case Law? Cartesio and 
Damseaux from a different Perspective: Part I, Intertax 37 (2009) 6-7, p. 349-350; Valk, 
O., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 152; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., fn. 1.
16 It is important to note that human beings, i.e. individuals, are given rights upon birth, 
the same is recognized to legal entities like companies. However, unlike individuals who 
are recognized by the mere fact of being alive, the companies are recognized as legal 
entities and given certain right only under conditions set out by the law of the recogniz-
ing country of company’s incorporation. Therefore, it can be inferred that the country 
of recognition decides whether and under what conditions to give life to a legal entity. 
Companies that are given life under the law of such recognizing country are considered 
as nationals of that country, i.e. they belong to that national legal order.
17 De Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 5; Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 
618.
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the legal order of the company’s original incorporation, i.e. the national order 
which recognizes and thus “gives life” to that legal entity.18 This means that a 
transfer of company’s registered seat entails a change in the applicable company 
law since the connecting factor would refer to a jurisdiction other than the one 
under whose law it was incorporated before such transfer of registered seat. 
Consequently, a company could not exist anymore as a company established 
under the law of the country of its original incorporation because the link with 
that country’s company law has been severed. On the other hand, registered 
seat theory also means that the seat of company’s management (i.e. company’s 
administrative seat)19 could be transferred to another country without breaking 
the link with the country of incorporation.20 Therefore, this theory’s advantage 
is that it permits the company registered under the registered seat theory to 
freely decide where to locate its administrative seat. In other words, companies 
would remain incorporated under the law of their country of incorporation even 
though they conducted all of their business activities or relocated its manage-
ment to another jurisdiction.21 Furthermore, it is fairly easy to determine lex 
societatis by application of the registered seat theory since it should be simple 
to identify the jurisdiction of the company’s incorporation.22 However, the 
18 Szudockzy, R., op. cit. in fn. 15., p. 350.
19 Company’s administrative seat represents the address of the company’s operational 
headquarters, the seat of company’s central administration (also known as the real seat, 
operational seat, company’s headquarters or head offi ce); Szydło, M., Emigration of 
Companies under the EC Treaty: Some Thoughts on the Opinion of Advocate General 
in Cartesio Case, European Review of Private Law 6 (2008), p. 974; Szudockzy, R., op. 
cit. in fn. 15., p. 350; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., fn. 2.
20 Szudockzy, R., op. cit. in fn. 15., p. 350; Bohrenkämper, J., op. cit. in fn. 2, p. 86; de 
Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 5.
21 This theory was developed to facilitate needs of UK companies that undertook their 
business operations in other countries (generally UK oveseas colonies) during the 18th 
century; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 4. 
22 This might not seem an easy task in regard to the real seat theory since it is often hard to 
determine where company’s administrative seat is actually located. Especially if we take 
into consideration that company management could organize its meetings in jurisdic-
tions other than the jurisdiction of company’s original incorporation under the admin-
istrative seat theory. In such situation, a valid question might arose as to whether the 
company’s administrative seat (a link to lex societatis of a jurisdiction grounded in the real 
seat theory) is located in the jurisdiction of company’s original incorporation grounded 
in the real seat theory or another jurisdiction where the management meetings were 
undertaken. For example, If that other jurisdiction is grounded in the real seat theory as 
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disadvantage of the registered seat theory is that it facilitates creation of the 
so called “letter box” companies.23 Another disadvantage could as well be that 
the Member State of company incorporation might fi nd it hard to maintain 
insight into company’s business operations, e.g. for the sake of tax purposes. 
Moreover, as a consequence there is a risk that a jurisdiction grounded in the 
registered seat theory could lose interest in companies that have only their 
registered seat located within its territory which could consequently even lead 
to deterioration of national control mechanism over such companies. Generally, 
the registered seat theory in its purest form does not take into consideration 
the interests of the jurisdiction where the company actually undertakes its 
business activities.24 Therefore, the registered seat theory is often referred to 
as a formalistic theory unlike its counterpart, the real seat theory. 
On the other hand, the real seat theory means that applicable company 
law would be the national law of the country where the company’s manage-
ment is placed or from where the company is administered.25 This theory gives 
emphasis to the jurisdiction where the company actually conducts its business 
activities regardless of the company’s place of incorporation.26 Therefore, the 
connecting factor is the place from where the company is managed or where 
the company’s management is situated.27 Analogously to the other theory, the 
well, that jurisdiction might claim that such company requires incorporation under its 
laws in order to be enabled to undertake business operations within its territory while 
the jurisdiction of company’s original incorporation might consider that such company 
is no longer considered a company registered under its laws since its management is not 
located anymore within its territory. The consequence in such situation might as well be 
company’s termination in the jurisdiction of company’s original incorporation. 
23 “Letter box” company is another expression used for pseudo foreign companies or off-
shore companies. Such companies are considered the ones that are established in a juris-
diction with which they have minimal business contact. The motive behind incorpora-
tion of such companies is to facilitate tax evasion in the country where the company’s 
business operations are conducted or to subject a company to a more liberal company 
law; Wyckaert, M., Jenné, F., op. cit. in fn. 7., p. 6.  
24 Valk, O., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 164.
25 Real seat theory is native to civil law legal orders like Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, 
Greece; Mucciarelli, F. M., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 283; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 
6; Wyckaert, M., Jenné, F., op. cit. in fn. 7., p. 4. 
26 BarbiÊ, J., op. cit. in fn. 11., p. 378; Valk, O., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 154, 161-162; John-
ston, A., Regulatory competition in European company law after Cartesio, European 
Law Review 34 (2009) 3, p. 382.
27 Szudockzy, R., op. cit. in fn. 15., p. 350.
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transfer of company’s administrative seat results in severance of the link with 
the jurisdiction of company’s registration and as a consequence leads to the 
change of lex societatis and winding up of the company.28 Therefore, as in the 
registered seat theory where the transfer of registered seat is prohibited, in the 
real seat theory the transfer of administrative seat is prohibited.29 The transfer 
of registered seat from the jurisdiction grounded in the real seat theory should 
be permitted (at least in legal theory) since the real seat theory does not rely 
on registered seat as its connecting factor. However, this is also not possible 
since it would make the applicable company law unenforceable.30 Furthermore, 
company laws usually demand registration of the company with the competent 
company register in the jurisdiction of company’s incorporation. Company 
register provides third parties with information on the company’s structure, 
leadership, share capital, business activities and etc. Therefore, Company 
register should primarily be located in the jurisdiction under whose law the 
company was originally incorporated.31 In other words, companies incorpo-
rated under the real seat theory (as well as the registered seat theory)32 are not 
permitted to transfer their registered seat from the jurisdiction of company’s 
incorporation. Therefore, we can conclude that jurisdictions grounded in the 
real seat theory are generally even more restrictive than their counterparts, i.e. 
jurisdictions grounded in the registered seat theory. That is because they forbid 
both the transfer of the company’s administrative seat as well as the transfer 
of the company’s registered seat.33 Notwithstanding, the advantage of the real 
28 Bohrenkämper, J., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 86; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 7.
29 Szudockzy, R., op. cit. in fn. 15., p. 350.
30 Mucciarelli, F. M., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 284; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 6.
31 Mucciarelli, F. M., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 284-285; That is because company register also 
represent a form of control over companies incorporated under the law of a jurisdiction 
where the company is incorporated and where such register is located. Such register 
is then enabled to force companies registered with it to comply with mandatory law 
requirements of the respective company law or face deletion (i.e. which corresponds to 
company’s termination) from the register. Notwithstanding that company’s subsidiaries 
and branches in other jurisdictions are generally also registered with respective company 
registers in those other jurisdictions. However, in such situation non-compliance with 
mandatory rules of that other jurisdiction will not result in company’s termination but 
only impossibility to undertake its business operations in that other jurisdiction. 
32 Since the registered seat represents the actual link with the jurisdiction ground in the 
registered seat theory. 
33 De Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., fn. 12.
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seat theory is that it takes into consideration protection of company’s minority 
shareholders, creditors and employees.34 In addition, it also prevents regulatory 
competition between countries and establishment of “letter box” companies.35 
However, real seat theory is severely restrictive on corporate mobility since not 
only that it binds the company’s management to a jurisdiction of company’s 
original incorporation but prevents transfer of company’s registered seat as well. 
In the modern decentralized global economy such approach might seem some-
what infl exible and overly burdensome to international business operators. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF DETERMINING LEX SOCIETATIS
These two general theories manifestly contradict each other and conse-
quently create signifi cant issues within the sphere of private international law 
and corporate mobility.36 For example, the obvious confl ict between the two 
theories arises when a company incorporated in the registered seat theory 
jurisdiction establishes a subsidiary for a sole purpose of undertaking all of its 
business activities in another jurisdiction which is grounded in the real seat 
theory. According to the registered seat theory the lex societatis would be the law 
of its place of registration, while according to the real seat theory the lex soci-
etatis would be the law of the place where the company undertakes its business 
activities. Therefore, each of these legal orders would direct to its own set of 
substantive company law rules. That leads not only to application of confl icting 
company laws and diverging legal solutions but could also lead to repudiation 
of company’s valid existence in the country that is grounded in the real seat 
theory.37 Therefore, corporate mobility in general international context is an 
intricate process where one should carefully consider the interplay of competing 
national confl ict of laws rules and the effect of applicable company laws. Fur-
thermore, it should be pointed out that normally these two types of company 
34 De Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 8; Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 
609 - 610.
35 Valk, O., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 162; Lombardo, S., Regulatory Competition in Company 
Law in the European Union after Cartesio, European Business Organization Law Review 
10 (2009), p. 636; Wyckaert, M., Jenné, F., op. cit. in fn. 7., p. 6.
36 That is because one allows for transfer of company’s administrative seat (the registered 
seat theory) while the other prevents such transfer (the administrative seat theory). 
37 BouËek, V., PejËiÊ, L., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 59.
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seats coincide in one jurisdiction,38 but due to rapid development of the global 
market that might change in the future. This conclusion is even supported by 
high interest of Community businessman for that form of corporate mobility 
between Member States. 39 This brings us to the practical question as to why 
would a company want to transfer only its registered seat or only its manage-
ment to another jurisdiction, or why would it want to transfer both of them 
simultaneously to another jurisdiction? Generally, corporate mobility enables 
companies to improve their business operations on the world market in several 
ways that depend on the actual form of the company seat transfer. However, 
the form of seat transfer that the company will opt for will usually depend on 
the business goals that the company involved intends to accomplish. 
V. TRANSFER OF COMPANY SEAT
Transfer of company’s registered seat alone involves a transfer of company’s 
registered seat to another jurisdiction while the company’s administrative seat 
remains in the jurisdiction of company’s original incorporation. By transfer 
of its registered seat, a company ceases to be a company incorporated under 
the home Member State’s law and becomes a company incorporated under 
the host Member State’s law. Therefore, since every modern legal order has its 
own set of company law rules,40 the main motive for such seat transfer is the 
intention to change the lex societatis.41 That is because some of these company 
38 That is especially true for small business enterprises. 
39 79% of respondents (stakeholders from the Community and several third countries) 
opted for adoption of directive on transfer of registered seat within the Community. (Di-
rectorate General for Internal Market and Services, the consultation on future priorities 
for the Action Plan on Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance, Summary 
Report, p. 16 (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/, visited 10.9.2010.).
40 Vossestein, G., Transfer of the registered offi ce The European Commission’s decision not 
to submit a proposal for a Directive, Utrecht Law Review 4 (2008) 1, p. 54; Wymeersch, 
E., Is a directive on Corporate Mobility needed?, European Business Organization Law 
Review 8 (2007), p. 166.
41 Rammeloo, S., The 14th EC Company Law Directive on the Cross-border Transfer of the 
Registered Offi ce of Limited Liability Companies - Now or Never, Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 15 (2009), p. 363 - 365; Wymeersch, E., op. cit. in fn. 
40., p. 166. To the best of our knowledge, Italy is the only country that permits transfer 
of company’s registered seat while being able to retain Italian lex societatis. (Rammeloo, 
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laws are more liberal while the other more restrictive in regulating everyday 
company operations. Such restrictive regulation is usually not without ground. 
For example, putting in place company control mechanisms can be to enable 
adequate protection of certain interest groups like company’s shareholders, 
employees and / or creditors. On the other hand it can as well be to enable 
easier oversight of company business operations by state regulatory institu-
tions. However, sometimes such extensive regulation might present overly 
burdensome requirements on the company. For example, company laws might 
be overly restrictive toward certain company operations like undertaking of 
certain business activities, establishment in other jurisdictions or company 
mergers or acquisitions. Consequently, being subject to such burdensome and 
restrictive regulation might result in company’s decision to transfer its registered 
seat to another jurisdiction and thus replace such burdensome company rules 
with more liberal rules of the target jurisdiction. Therefore, the driving force 
behind the transfer of registered seat is intention to exchange one lex societatis 
for another, i.e. lex societatis that is more favorable to company’s business inten-
tions. However, such change of lex societatis will normally mean that a company 
will also have to adjust to the new lex societatis, meaning that such a transfer 
would usually entail company’s reincorporation in the host jurisdiction.42 And 
such reincorporation would have to be possible by both the company law of 
the home jurisdiction and the host jurisdiction. However, the change of lex 
societatis is not always the only reason for such seat transfer. For example, a 
company might also seek to minimize its tax liability in the jurisdiction of its 
original incorporation.43 
Unlike the registered seat transfer, when company decides to transfer its 
administrative seat to another jurisdiction, usually its registered seat remains in 
the jurisdiction of its incorporation while its administration moves to another 
jurisdiction. The reasons behind such administrative seat transfer are mostly 
S., fn. 101). However, it is uncertain what would an Italian company accomplish by 
transferring only its registered seat to another jurisdiction and what would be the conse-
quences of such transfer for the Italian company in the target jurisdiction.
42 Wymeersch, E., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 168.
43 Jurisdictions can tax domestic companies based on company’s worldwide income. Con-
sequently, companies that conduct their business activities solely in other jurisdictions 
might want to transfer their registered seat to another jurisdiction and thus disable the 
ability of the home Member State to tax that company’s worldwide income. Wymeersch, 
E., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 166.
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those of facilitating better mobility of company management and lowering 
associated company management costs. For example, in modern day global 
market economy increasing numbers of companies conduct their business 
activities in several jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, it could be imag-
ined that a company undertakes a preponderant part of its business activities 
abroad as well. Undertaking such activities could require increasing levels of 
company management mobility.44 Therefore, such companies might want to 
transfer their management to a jurisdiction where most of their business activi-
ties are undertaken. As a consequence, such transfer could lower transaction 
costs because company management could get familiar with the laws and the 
business environment of the target jurisdiction.45 Usually there should be no 
problem concerning transfer of administrative seat of the company that is in-
corporated in the jurisdiction with the registered seat theory. That is because 
such jurisdiction permits transfer of administrative seat. At the same time, it 
also permits retention of company’s nationality of the incorporation jurisdiction 
for as long as company’s registered seat is located in that jurisdiction. However, 
that might not always be the case because there are occasions when even such 
jurisdictions can set out certain restriction in regard to transfer of company’s 
administrative seat.46 Unlike the registered seat theory, the real seat theory is 
unfriendly towards this type of transfer. That is only natural because real seat 
theory relies on the location of the company’s administrative seat as a link 
that connects a company to a certain jurisdiction. 
Finally, there is also a possibility of simultaneous transfer of both the compa-
ny’s registered seat and its administrative seat from the jurisdiction of company’s 
original incorporation to another target jurisdiction. The reasons behind this 
transfer are those combined from the previous two situations. Consequently, 
where it is company’s intention to transfer its business activities abroad along 
with its intention to take advantage of the target jurisdiction’s more appropri-
44 Drury, R. R., Migrating Companies, European Law Review 24 (1999) 4, p. 354; de 
Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 8. 
45 Rammeloo, S., op. cit. in fn. 41., p. 362-363.
46 For example in Case 81/87, the Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1988], ECR p. 05483 (hereinafter: 
DAILY MAIL), UK as a Member State that is grounded in the registered seat theory 
denied company the right to transfer its administrative seat to another Member State 
due to tax evasion reasons.
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ate lex societatis, transfer of both registered and administrative seat occurs.47 
Naturally, such dual seat transfer would usually require company’s reincorpora-
tion in the jurisdiction where such transfer is to be effectuated. However, for 
reincorporation to be effective it must not only be allowed from the position 
of the jurisdiction of original incorporation but also from the position of the 
target jurisdiction.48 Therefore, upon reincorporation such company would no 
longer be considered as a company established under the law of the jurisdic-
tion of original incorporation but as a company established under the law of 
the target jurisdiction.49 In other words, the target jurisdiction would become 
company’s new jurisdiction of incorporation. 
However, when we put corporate mobility within the context of European 
Union (hereinafter: EU) and thus Community law, the end result is signifi cantly 
different because such corporate mobility falls within the ambit of Community 
law and not under diverse national confl ict of laws rules. That is because Com-
munity level corporate mobility is covered by one of the fundamental freedoms 
of Community law, i.e. the freedom of establishment. Freedom of establishment, 
as one of Community given rights, imposes upon Member States a specifi c set 
of rules which regulate Member State’s conduct in regard to corporate mobility 
between them.50 In other words, these rules provide a specifi c set of Community 
level rules that supersede national company and confl ict of laws rules in relation to 
corporate mobility. However, at the current stage of Community law development, 
freedom of establishment still does not resolve the major differences between the 
two confl ict of laws theories mentioned above nor provides a solution that will 
ensure uniform rules on corporate mobility between Member State.
VI. THE PRIMARY SOURCES OF CORPORATE MOBILITY WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT
Principally, primary sources of Community law include all the treaties establish-
ing the European Communities and the European Union along with supplementing 
47 Rammeloo, S., op. cit. in fn. 41., p. 365.
48 Mucciarelli, F. M., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 286
49 Grundmann, S., European company law: organization, fi nance and capital markets, An-
twerpen 2007, para. 837.
50 For more on freedom of establishment see the following chapter. 
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annexes and protocols (hereinafter: Treaties).51 Treaties provide a framework for 
organization and operation of the EU administered through Community institu-
tions.52 In other words, Treaties represent a legal basis for everyday life of the EU. 
In this light, certain Treaty provisions are capable of having direct effect in regard 
to individual’s rights.53 This means that individuals are capable of directly invoking 
such Community given rights contained within the Treaties either against Member 
States or against each other.54 In addition, Member State’s national courts are 
under obligation to recognize and enforce such directly effective Treaty provisions. 
Although some conditions exist that must be fulfi lled in order for a Treaty provision 
to be considered directly effective,55 certain freedom of establishment provisions 
are recognized as directly effective by ECJ case law.56 
51 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community signed on 25 March 1957 (also 
known as the Rome Treaty), (http://www.ena.lu/?lang=2&doc=16304, visited 10.9.2010.), 
(hereinafter: EEC Treaty); Treaty on European Union signed on 7 February 1992 (also 
known as the Treaty of Maastricht), OJ 1992 C 191, (hereinafter: TEU);  Treaty of Am-
sterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and related acts signed on 2 October 1997 (also known as the Amsterdam 
Treaty), OJ 1997 C 340 (hereinafter: TEC); Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and certain related acts 
signed on 26 February 2001 (known as the Nice Treaty), OJ 2001 C 80; Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity (known as the Lisbon Treaty), OJ 2007 C 306 (hereinafter: TFEU).
52 However, Treaties cannot regulate every aspect of the vast and complex EU. Therefore, 
secondary sources of Community law like directives and ECJ case law facilitate effective 
practical application of Community law in everyday situations. For more on secondary 
sources of Community law see the chapter 7 “The Directive on Cross-border Transfer of 
Company Seat” and fn. 89. 
53 Δapeta, T., Sudovi Europske unije: Nacionalni sudovi kao europski sudovi, Zagreb 2002, 
p. 34.
54 This is also the difference between horizontal direct effect and vertical direct effect. First 
enables individuals to invoke Community given rights against other individuals while the 
second enables individuals to invoke Community given rights against the Member States. 
55 Two general conditions need to be fulfi lled: (i) that the provision is suffi ciently clear and 
(ii) that it is unconditional. Regarding the (i) condition, provision is considered to be 
clear when on the basis of its text it can be ascertained who is the holder of the right, 
who is the obliged person and what would be the content of that right or obligation; 
Δapeta, T., op. cit. in fn. 53., p. 32.
56 “It must be stated fi rstly that Article 52 of the EEC Treaty embodies one of the fundamental 
principles of the Community and has been directly applicable in the Member States [emphasis 
added] since the end of the transitional period.” (Case C-270/83, Commission v France 
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In TFEU the freedom of establishment rules remain substantially unchanged 
in relation equivalent provisions in the previous Treaties.
So, what freedom of establishment actually means? Although relevant 
Treaty provisions provide a general answer to this question, ECJ case law tried 
to provide a more practical defi nition by stating that freedom of establishment 
represents:
“…the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fi xed establishment 
in another Member State for an indefi nite period [emphasis added]”57.
Not only that the above FACTORTAME II statement provides one viable 
interpretation of freedom of establishment but it is also considered that it 
provides subjective criterion required for application of freedom of establish-
ment.58 Specifi cally, in order for a company to be able to invoke freedom of 
establishment it should cumulatively: (i) pursue an actual business activity, (ii) 
pursue such business activity through a fi xed establishment, (iii) such pursuit 
of actual business activity is to be taken in a Member State other than the 
Member State of company’s original incorporation and (iv) it should intend 
to undertake its business activities in another Member State for an indefi nite 
period of time.
Regarding the (i) requirement, i.e. pursuit of actual or genuine business ac-
tivity, it is not required that a company already pursues such business activity 
in the host Member State59 for it to be entitled the right to invoke freedom 
[1986], ECR 273 para. 13). To that effect see as well: Case C-270/83, Commission v 
France [1986], ECR 273, para. 26; Case C-11/77, Patrick [1977], ECR 1199, para. 13; 
Case C-2/74, Reyners [1974], ECR 631 paras. 10, 12, 25, 30; Case C-53/95, Inasti 
[1996], ECR I-703, para. 9; Case C-143/87, Stanton [1988], ECR 3877, para. 10; Not-
withstanding, it is still questionable whether the same principle, as applied to individu-
als, can be applied to companies as well, for more on this issue see the section that relates 
to CARTESIO. 
57 Case C-221/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd 
and others. [1991], ECR I-03905, para. 20 (hereinafter: FACTORTAME II).
58 Looijestijn-Clearie, A., Centros Ltd: A Complete U-Turn in the Right of Establishment 
for Companies?, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (2000) 3, p. 
623.
59 For the sake of defi ning, transfer of either the registered seat or administrative seat can 
be perceived both from the position of the home Member State (Member State from 
which the company transferring its seat also known as the Member State of origin) and 
from the position of the host Member State (Member State to which the company is 
transferring its seat also known as the target Member State). This differentiation be-
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of establishment. If that would not be so, then the effectiveness of the right to 
invoke freedom of establishment would be diminished since a company would 
already have to be undertaking business activities in the host Member State for 
an unspecifi ed amount of time. Therefore, it is enough for a company only to 
have an intention to pursue such business activity in the host Member State.60 
The (ii) and (iv) requirement only further elaborate on the manner in which 
such pursuit of business activity in the host Member State must be carried out. 
In other words, a company should undertake business activities through a fi xed 
establishment and for an indefi nite period of time. For example, an undertaking’s 
preparatory business activities, information gathering on a certain market or use 
of warehouse solely for the purpose of goods delivery to customers would not 
comply with the set out “fi xed establishment” requirement. Similarly, an under-
taking’s business activities in another Member State for a limited amount of 
time (e.g. for an execution of a specifi c business operation or pursuance of a time 
limited business objective) would not meet the (iv) requirement, i.e. pursuance 
of business activities for an indefi nite period of time. The (iii) requirement, i.e. 
pursuit of business activity in a Member State other than the Member State of 
company’s original incorporation, only serves to provide a Community element 
to the company’s right to seek protection of freedom of establishment. In purely 
national situations, i.e. situations in which all facts are confi ned within a jurisdic-
tion of a single Member State, freedom of establishment cannot be invoked.61 
Such concept of freedom of establishment was even further refi ned in sub-
sequent GEBHARD ruling where it was stated that:
“The concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is therefore 
a very broad one, allowing a Community national to participate, on a stable and 
continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin 
and to profi t therefrom [emphasis added]…”62.
tween the home Member State and the host Member State is as well refl ected in Com-
munity law. See as well the text following fn. 79.
60 Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982], ECR 1035, para. 21; Case C-
55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995], 
ECR 1-4165, para. 32 (hereinafter: GEBHARD). 
61 Case C-108/98, RI.SAN. [1999], ECR I-5219, para. 23; Case C-134/95, USSL [1997], 
ECR I-195, para. 19; Joined Cases C-54/88 & others, Eleonora [1990], ECR 3537, para. 
11; Ringe, W., No Freedom of Emigration for Companies?, unpublished version, p. 21 
(available at: www.ssrn.com, visited 10.9.2010.).
62 GEBHARD, para. 25
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Referring back to the Treaties, TFEU through Articles 49 to 55 provides 
provisions that relate to the freedom of establishment for both individuals and 
companies or fi rms validly formed within the EU. These provisions provide for 
more objective criteria and defi nition of freedom of establishment. Therefore, 
according to Article 49 (2) TFEU63 freedom of establishment represents:
“… the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and 
to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or fi rms within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions 
laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such es-
tablishment is effected…”
This wording provides that individuals from one Member States have the 
right to pursue business activities in another Member State under same condi-
tions as individuals of that other Member State conduct their business activities 
in the territory of that other Member State. Unlike the second paragraph, the 
fi rst paragraph of Article 49 TFEU64 is worded negatively. It provides that:
“…restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member 
State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such 
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in 
the territory of any Member State.”
Therefore, Article 49 (1) TFEU prohibits restrictions imposed by Members 
States upon nationals of another Member State in regard to exercise of freedom 
of establishment. In other words, a Member State cannot discriminate between 
its own nationals and nationals of the other Member State’s. Therefore, accord-
ing to freedom of establishment Member States must provide equal treatment 
to every individual, i.e. a citizen of the Community.  
One cannot fail to notice that from the quoted Treaty provision it appears 
that freedom of establishment applies only to Member State individuals, i.e. 
natural persons. However, freedom of establishment chapter contains a provi-
sion which provides that this fundamental freedom shall also extend to legal 
entities as well, considering that certain additional requirements are complied 
with. Specifi cally, (i) that the legal entity has been validly formed in accordance 
63 For future reference, this article corresponds to Article 43 (2) TEC and Article 52 (2) 
EEC.
64 For future reference, this article corresponds to Article 43 (1) TEC and Article 52 (1) 
EEC.
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with the law of a Member State and (ii) that it has registered offi ce, central 
administration or principal place of business within EU. To that effect, exact 
wording of the relevant Article 54 (1) TFEU65 provides the following:
“Companies or fi rms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered offi ce, central administration or principal place of business 
within the Union [emphasis added] shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be 
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member 
States.”
We can see that, unlike ECJ case law established subjective requirements 
required for application of freedom of establishment, TFEU provides for purely 
objective requirements. The (ii) requirement of having registered offi ce, central 
administration or principal place of business within the EU applies alterna-
tively but acts cumulatively with the (i) requirement, i.e. that a company is 
validly established under the law of a home Member State. From the wording 
of Article 54 (1) TFEU it can also be perceived that freedom of establishment 
is applicable “in the same way” to companies (that meet the above mentioned 
conditions) as it is to Member State’s individuals. Consequently, it seems that 
the Treaties equally treat companies and individuals in regard to their right to 
invoke protection of freedom of establishment.66 Admittedly, there are indeed 
apparent distinctions between the two (e.g. artifi cial nature of a legal entity 
as compared to physical nature of an individual). However, at least from the 
wording of Article 54 (1) TFEU it seems that no distinction should exist. Only 
distinction provided for is in regard to different conditions required for applica-
tion of freedom of establishment to legal entities, i.e. companies.67
Article 49 (1) TFEU provides that this prohibition of restrictions applies 
both to “setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any 
Member State established in the territory of any Member State” (second sen-
tence) and to “establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory 
of another Member State” (fi rst sentence). It is important to note that these 
two sentences provide for two different rights of establishment. Specifi cally, 
the fi rst sentence refers to right of primary establishment, i.e. freedom to set 
65 For future reference, this article corresponds to Article 48 (1) TEC and Article 58 (1) 
EEC.
66 Barnard, C., The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, Second Edition, New 
York 2007, p. 331.
67 See the previous section of the text accompanying fn. 65. 
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up and manage a company in any Member State68, while the second sentence 
represents the right of secondary establishment, i.e. establishment of agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries within territory of any Member State.69 
However, note that these two rights are not the same in regard to condi-
tions required for their application. This assertion derives from the wording of 
Article 49 (1) TFEU which sets out more rigorous requirements for secondary 
establishment than for primary establishment. It provides that restrictions on 
secondary establishment are prohibited for “nationals of any Member State” 
and for those that are “established in … any Member State”. Therefore, in or-
der for an individual to be able to invoke the right of secondary establishment 
he must: (i) be a national of any Member State and (ii) already be established 
in any Member State. Individual’s Member State and the Member State of 
establishment mentioned in these two conditions need not be the same. 
Unlike individuals whose right to invoke freedom of establishment is gov-
erned solely by Article 49 (1) TFEU, when considering a company’s right to 
invoke that freedom we have to look to Article 54 (1) TFEU as well. Now by 
combining these two articles we come to the following result. Instead of Mem-
ber State’s nationality (the requirement (i) as set out above) different require-
ments apply to companies, i.e. the condition of valid formation of company 
under Member State law and the requirement of having one of three effective 
links with the Member State (either registered offi ce, central administration 
or principal place of business).70 However, (ii) requirement from Article 49 (1) 
TFEU still remains, i.e. the requirement of being established within any Member 
State. In other words, the requirement of “being established” is not the same 
as conditions set out by Article 54 (1) TFEU, i.e. company’s valid formation 
under Member State law and having a connection with a Member State. 
68 The right of primary establishment also includes the right to transfer company’s seat 
to another Member State; DAILY MAIL, para. 12; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 
41 - 42; Cerioni, L., The cross-border mobility of companies within the European Com-
munity after the Cartesio ruling of the ECJ, unpublished, text following fn. 1 (www.ssrn.
com, visited 10.9.2010.); Wyckaert, M., Jenné, F., op. cit. in fn. 7., p. 3. 
69 BouËek, V., PejËiÊ, L., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 60; de Burca, G., Craig, P., EU Law, Text, Cases, 
and Materials, Second Edition, New York 1998, p. 756; Mucciarelli, F. M., op. cit. in fn. 
14., p. 293; Barnard, C., op. cit. in fn. 66., p. 310, 332-333.
70 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd [1999], ECR I-1459 (hereinafter: CENTROS), para. 20; 
Case C-264/96, ICI [1998] ECR I-0000, para. 20 (hereinafter: ICI).
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This requirement of being established within EU is complied with: “…when 
there is a real and continuous link with the economy of a Member State [emphasis 
added]”.71 In other words, it means genuine pursuit of business activity within 
any Member State.72 There have been certain signals that suggest that secondary 
establishment actually demands genuine pursuit of company’s business activity 
in company’s home Member State.73 The reasoning behind such assertion was 
to deny protection of Community law to non-EU companies that are primarily 
established within a certain Member State only as “letter box” companies with 
a sole purpose to then proliferate by secondary establishment to other Member 
States where company’s actual and genuine economic pursuit would then be 
undertaken.74 However, such assertions were later quelled by the ECJ case law 
in addition to the wording of the Treaty that clearly states “established in the 
territory of any Member State [emphasis added]”.75 Therefore, in order for a 
company to invoke the right of secondary establishment it is enough that it is 
established, i.e. that it pursues genuine business activity, within either a home 
Member State or the host Member State. 
Unlike secondary establishment, primary establishment from the preced-
ing sentence of the same paragraph requires only that an individual seeking 
establishment in another Member State is a national of any Member State, i.e. 
same as the above requirement (i) concerning secondary establishment.76 That 
is due to possibility of multiple secondary establishments while there can be 
only one primary establishment.
71 Grundmann, S., op. cit. in fn. 49., paras. 216, 837.
72 Barnard, C., op. cit. in fn. 66., p. 310; Looijestijn-Clearie, A., op. cit. in fn. 58., p. 626; 
Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für Kör-
perschaften. [2006], ECR I-08203, para. 19; Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc 
and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue. [2006], 
ECR I-07995, para. 54. 
73 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment ad-
opted on 18 December 1961, OJ 36/62, OJ Sp Edn 1974, Second Series IX (hereinafter: 
General Programme); Looijestijn-Clearie, A., op. cit. in fn. 58., p. 627.
74 Grundmann, S., op. cit. in fn. 49., para. 837.
75 For the text of Article 49 (1) TFEU see previous text following fn. 62 - 63. Furthermore, 
ECJ case law suggests that a company complies with the requirement of being estab-
lished if it is formed under the law of a Member State and has its registered seat within 
the Community; SEGERS, para. 16; CENTROS, para. 17; INSPIRE ART, paras. 86 
- 97.
76 Grundmann, S., op. cit. in fn. 49., para. 219.
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Article 54 TFEU77 provides an answer as to which types of legal entities 
are entitled to seek protection under freedom of establishment. That article 
provides that:
“Companies or fi rms” means companies or fi rms constituted under civil 
or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons 
governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profi t-mak-
ing.”
Such broad defi nition of Article 54 (2) TFEU encompasses a wide array of 
private or public legal entities. However, from its scope are expressly excluded 
non-profi t making legal entities. This would be in line with the general com-
mercial focus of the Treaties and other Fundamental Freedoms (e.g. Freedom 
of Movement for Workers, Freedom to Provide Services).78 However, this also 
means that Community law authorized Member States to determine which 
entities would be entitled to invoke protection of freedom of establishment.79
Furthermore, when a certain company transfer is perceived from the position 
of the Member State of origin, that situation is called “company’s emigration” 
or an outbound situation. On the other hand, when a certain seat transfer is 
perceived from the position of the host Member State that situation is quali-
fi ed as “company’s immigration” or an inbound situation.80 Furthermore, if a 
certain Community recognized fundamental freedom (e.g. like the freedom of 
establishment or a freedom to provide services) is considered to provide protec-
tion from both the home Member State restriction (i.e. emigration) and the 
host Member State restriction (i.e. immigration) that freedom is considered 
a two-fold freedom. However, although it was clear for all other fundamental 
freedoms that they are two-fold, for freedom of establishment an issue arose 
as to its nature because it was not as clear whether that freedom is as well 
construed as a two-fold freedom or not.81 Eventually it was established that 
77 For future reference, this article corresponds to Article 48 (2) TEC and Article 58 (2) 
EEC.
78 de Burca, G., Craig, P., op. cit. in fn. 69., p. 756.
79 That would be by determining the form of their specifi c national entities, i.e. whether a 
certain entity is to be regarded as a legal entity (e.g. company) or not; Lombardo, S., op. 
cit. in fn. 35., p. 639. 
80 Szydło, M., op. cit. in fn. 19., p. 975; Valk, O., op. cit. in fn. 14., p. 152.
81 The Treaty articles on freedom of establishment clearly cover the right of companies to 
pursue their business activities in the host Member State (i.e. immigration situations). 
According to the Article 49 TFEU and Article 54 TFEU companies are entitled to con-
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duct their business activities in the host Member State and such right cannot regularly 
be restricted (CENTROS, para. 39; INSPIRE ART, paras. 104 - 105, ÜBERSEERING, 
para. 82). However, the question arises whether freedom of establishment entitles com-
panies in their home Member State to leave that Member State notwithstanding the na-
tional restrictions imposed by their home Member State (i.e. emigration situations). In 
other words, does the freedom of establishment enable home Member States to restrict 
companies incorporated under its law to transfer their seat to another Member State? 
The issue referred to here is the one of the two-fold nature of the freedom of establish-
ment. The answer should be affi rmative. Free movement of goods, free movement of 
services and free movement of workers are all construed as two-fold freedoms. [Ringe, 
W., op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 23-28 (www.ssrn.com, visited 10.9.2010.)].  In its landmark 
GEBHARD ruling ECJ clearly stated that all fundamental freedoms should be similarly 
construed. (GEBHARD, para. 37; Bohrenkämper, J., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 87; Ringe, W., 
op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 29-30). In other words, that would also mean that all fundamental 
freedoms should be two-fold, including freedom of establishment as well. However, DAI-
LY MAIL seems to suggest the opposite by stating that if the restriction comes from the 
direction of the home Member State, the company cannot invoke freedom of establish-
ment. (DAILY MAIL, para. 25). However, that same ruling initially clearly stated that: 
“Even though those provisions are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and 
companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that 
State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment 
in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its 
legislation which comes within the defi nition contained in Article 58 [emphasis added]. 
As the Commission rightly observed, the rights guaranteed by Articles 52 et seq. would 
be rendered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from 
leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member State.”. (DAILY MAIL, 
para. 16). Therefore, DAILY MAIL dictum might not seem as straightforward as initially 
suggested. Furthermore, restriction of freedom of establishment in the emigration situ-
ation can have a more serious consequence for corporate mobility than the restriction 
in immigration situation. In immigration situation if a company is denied the right to 
enter a host Member State it can still seek to establish in the Member State other than 
the one initially intended that does not deny that company the right to establish in that 
Member State. However, in emigration situations where a home Member State prohibits 
company the right to exit her jurisdiction in order to establish in another Member State, 
a company is not only entitled to move its seat to the intended host Member State but 
as well as to any other Member State since its right to transfer abroad is completely 
negated by its Member State of incorporation. (Ringe, W., op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 18). 
Consequently, while companies are generally enabled to invoke protection of freedom of 
establishment in immigration situations [CENTROS, Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v 
Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002], ECR I-09919 
(hereinafter: ÜBERSEERING),  and INSPIRE ART (altogether hereinafter: CENTROS 
et al. )] in regard to emigration situations [e.g. DAILY MAIL and CARTESIO], although 
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freedom of establishment is indeed a two-fold freedom, however with certain 
restrictions in regard to emigration situations.82
Furthermore, one might also wonder why Member States restrict corporate 
mobility in such emigration and immigration situations. There are several rea-
sons. In emigration situations home Member State usually prohibits transfers 
to another Member States in order to protect its tax interests. By transfer of 
company’s seat, depending on the national tax system, the host Member State 
might lose a tax payer.83 Another viable reason would be the preservation of 
home Member State’s control over the company incorporated under its law. 
In other words, change of lex societatis would in turn result in the loss of that 
Member State’s ability to provide protection to certain interest groups (e.g. 
shareholders, employees or creditors) through control mechanism incorporated 
in its company law.84 
On the other hand, why would a Member State set restrictions on companies 
entering its jurisdiction? That is due to fear of “unlimited corporate mobility”.85 
This means that a company incorporated under the law of the home Member 
State could conduct its business activities in another Member State according 
to the rules provided by the company law under which it was incorporated in 
freedom of establishment covers these situation as well, it is an issue of what is required 
to trigger the application of freedom of establishment. Answer to this issue was one of 
the biggest contributions of CARTESIO (CARTESIO, paras. 108 - 110). 
82 The issue related is the one whether a home Member State can restrict companies in-
corporated under its law in invoking protection of freedom of establishment when they 
intend to transfer their company seat to another Member State. This is the issue that 
was resolved in CARTESIO where ECJ held that company’s right to transfer its company 
seat is completely dependent upon the law of the home Member State (CARTESIO, 
para. 109). In other words, home Member State can freely decide whether to permit 
companies incorporated under its law to transfer their seat to another Member State or 
not. 
83 Ringe, W., op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 3. This was the situation in DAILY MAIL where the UK 
national tax law required consent of competent tax authorities in order for a company 
to transfer its administrative seat to another Member State. That was because accord-
ing to the relevant UK tax law provision company’s tax residence was determined by 
the location of its administrative seat. By transferring administrative seat outside UK, 
transferring company was no longer deemed to be resident of the UK for tax purposes 
(DAILY MAIL, paras. 2, 4). 
84 Ringe, W., op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 3.
85 Ringe, W., op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 4.
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the home Member State while disregarding conditions set out by the company 
law of the host Member State. Practically this means that companies could 
avoid application of mandatory company law provisions of the host Member 
State (e.g. minimum capital requirements for foreign subsidiaries).86 This fear 
is generally attributed to the real seat theory which as a consequence requires 
application of the company law at the place of company’s actual pursuit of busi-
ness activities or location of corporate management regardless of the jurisdiction 
of company’s incorporation. Thus, such jurisdictions mandate undertaking of 
business operations by foreign companies within their territory by conforming 
to the mandatory requirements imposed by their respective company laws (e.g. 
rules on minimal share capital).
To conclude, Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, in combination with the remaining 
provisions in the freedom of establishment chapter, provide ground rules on 
corporate mobility within the Community. Freedom of establishment means 
that a host Member State is not allowed to treat a company established in 
another Member State less favorably than a company incorporated under its 
own law (immigration situation). Furthermore, it should also mean that a 
home Member State cannot restrict its company from undertaking its business 
activities in another Member State (emigration situation).87 The purpose of 
freedom of establishment is to ensure equal treatment of foreign individuals 
in the host Member State as well as to prohibit home Member State from 
preventing its own individuals from undertaking business activities in another 
Member State.88
86 Ringe, W., op. cit. in fn. 61., p. 4.
87 ICI, para 21; C-471/04, Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v Keller Holding GmbH 
[2006], ECR I-02107, para. 30; Case C-293/06, Deutsche Shell GmbH v Finanz-
amt für Großunternehmen in Hamburg [2008], ECR I-01129, para. 29 (hereinafter: 
DEUTSCHE SHELL); Deak, D., Outbound establishment revisited in Cartesio, EC Tax 
Review, 2008/6, p. 255 - 256.
88 C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) 
[2005], ECR I-10837, para. 31; C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfi nanz eG v Finanzamt Köln-
Mitte [2007], ECR I-02647, para. 26; C-196/03, Arnaldo Lucaccioni v Commission of 
the European Communities [2004], ECR I-02683, para. 42; C-298/05, Columbus Con-
tainer Services BVBA & Co. v Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt [2007], ECR I-10451, 
para. 33; Deak, D., op. cit. in fn. 87., p. 256.
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VII. THE DIRECTIVE ON CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER OF 
COMPANY SEAT
Although mentioned freedom of establishment provisions provide some 
ground rules in regard to corporate mobility and thus transfer of company seat, 
Treaty rules certainly cannot cover  every legal situation that might occur in 
practice. In such a situation, it is upon other Community institutions to fi ll the 
legal gap either by interpretation of the freedom of establishment provisions89 
89 Since Treaties provide only for general rules in regard to application of Community law 
such generic provisions are open to diverse interpretations in every day application of 
Community law. However, this threat was recognized and consequently a Community 
level institution (i.e. ECJ) was established that was to facilitate uniform application of 
Community law and quell such danger of diverse interpretations of Community law. 
ECJ’s primary task is that of authoritative interpretation of Community law.(Δapeta, T., 
op. cit. in fn. 53., p. 183). Through such interpretative rulings ECJ ensures uniform and 
steady interpretation of Community law which consequently facilitates effective applica-
tion of Community law (Δapeta, T., op. cit. in fn. 53., p. 180, 186). If there would be no 
such institution, every Member State’s national court could interpret Community law 
on its own which would result in legal uncertainty and would in turn seriously diminish 
the effectiveness of Community law and thus even the purpose of internal market. How-
ever, although individuals and companies are free to invoke Community given rights 
before their national courts, it must be stressed that it is solely upon the Member State’s 
national court and not a Member State individual or a company to initiate proceedings 
before ECJ (in the form of preliminary ruling procedure) (de Burca, G., Craig, P., op. cit. 
in fn. 69., p. 407; Δapeta, T., op. cit. in fn. 53., p. 183). Therefore, only a Member State 
national court may seek preliminary ruling from ECJ in order to clarify a certain Com-
munity law issue and thus provide a solution to the specifi c dispute that it was seized 
with. (Article 267 TFEU, corresponding to Article 234 TEC and Article 177 EEC). Once 
the preliminary ruling is given, ECJ’s ruling is binding for the referring Member State 
whose national court must comply with the interpretation given by ECJ (de Burca, G., 
Craig, P., op. cit. in fn. 69., p. 407, 256; Babayev, R. R., Legal Autonomy vs. Political 
Power: What is the Role of the European Court of Justice in the European Integration?, 
unpublished, p. 2 (www.ssrn.com, visited 10.9.2010.); Δapeta, T., op. cit. in fn. 53., p. 
184). However, it must be noted that ECJ’s ruling is not only binding for the referring 
national court but as well as all the other Member State’s national courts that have 
been engaged with the similar Community law issue (de Burca, G., Craig, P., op. cit. in 
fn. 69., p. 408, 418; Babayev, R. R., op. cit. in fn. 89., p. 2). This rule of precedent was 
set out in ECJ’s case law where it was stated that an interpretation of Community law 
already given on a similar case releases the competent national court of its duty to refer 
questions to ECJ regarding interpretation of Community law (as set out by Article 267 
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or by providing a legal instrument that would facilitate such situations. In the 
context of freedom of establishment an initiative to provide such a legal instru-
ment that would facilitate cross-border seat transfer is an old one. 
The fi rst idea arose during the 1960’s in the form a convention. The Member 
States of the European Economic Community recognized even back then the 
need for a unifying legal instrument that would enable cross-border corporate 
mobility. Convention was eventually signed on 29 February 1968 by then 
six Member States.90 However, it eventually never came into force because 
one of the Member States failed to ratify it.91 The belief was that harmoniza-
tion through this convention would strengthen the economy of the involved 
Member States. It is even suggested that what Member States intended was to 
fi nd a way to avoid regulatory competition between their respective national 
company laws.92 
The idea was revived in 1997 when the fi rst draft for the “Proposal for 
Fourteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on the Transfer of the 
(3) TFEU) (Joined cases 28 to 30/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV [1963], ECR 31; Case 
283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanifi cio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982], ECR 
3415, paras. 13 - 14, 16 (hereinafter: CILFIT); de Burca, G., Craig, P., op. cit. in fn. 
69., p. 414 - 415). Such principle of precedent placed ECJ in a superior position against 
national courts of the Member States. Consequently, earlier ECJ rulings could be relied 
on by national courts faced with a similar issue already decided in previous ECJ case 
law. However, this does not deprive national courts faced with a similar Community law 
issue already decided by ECJ case law to refer that issue once again to ECJ for another 
preliminary ruling (CILFIT, para. 15.).  Therefore, since its humble beginnings ECJ has 
positioned itself as a signifi cant factor in Community law development and the process 
of Community integration (de Burca, G., Craig, P., op. cit. in fn. 69., p. 78 - 79, 409; 
Szudockzy, R., op. cit. in fn. 15., p. 347; Δapeta, T., op. cit. in fn. 53., p. 78.; Babayev, 
R. R., op. cit. in fn. 89., p. 3.). Through the preliminary ruling procedure ECJ has given 
one of its most seminal rulings and established many of today commonly used Com-
munity law principles like the principle of direct effect and supremacy of Community 
law. Consequently, it is impossible to disregard decades of Community law development 
that was primarily undertaken through ECJ’s case law on freedom of establishment and 
corporate mobility within EU. However, due to limited scope of this work we are unable 
to relate to freedom of establishment case law.
90 Convention on Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons of 29 February 
1968, Bulleting of the European Communities, Supplement No. 2-1969, p. 7 - 16 
(http://aei.pitt.edu/5610/01/002314_1.pdf, visited 10.9.2010).
91 Wymeersch, E., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 162.
92 Wymeersch, E., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 162.
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Registered Offi ce or De Facto Head Offi ce of a Company from One Member 
State to Another” was issued (hereinafter: 14th Company Law Directive).93 
The legal basis for such a proposal and the future directive can be found in 
the Treaties. Namely, Article 50 (1) TFEU94 and Article 50 (2) g TFEU95 en-
able Community institutions to issue a directive in order to attain freedom of 
establishment. Therefore, in 2003 Commission issued “Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union 
- A Plan to Move Forward” (hereinafter: Commission’s Action Plan) which 
also included creation of a proposal for the 14th Company Law Directive.96 
The 14th Company Law Directive would facilitate transfer of company’s reg-
istered offi ce to another host Member State where it would be registered as 
a company incorporated under the law of the host Member State.97 In other 
words, such transfer of registered seat would also entail a change of lex societatis. 
That would mean that transferring companies would have to conform to the 
conditions laid down in the new lex societatis. This mechanism would facilitate 
preservation of the company’s legal personality and would thus not force a 
company to go through the process of liquidation.98 After undergoing several 
93 Proposal for Fourteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on the Tansfer of 
the Registered Offi ce or De Facto Head Offi ce of a Company from One Member State to 
Another, 20 April 1997, XV/6002/97-EN REV.2.
94 “In order to attain freedom of establishment as regards a particular activity, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall act by means 
of directives.” For future reference, this article corresponds to Article 44 (1) TEC and 
Article 54 (3) EEC.
95 “The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties 
devolving upon them under the preceding provisions, in particular: … (g) by coordinat-
ing to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies or fi rms within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Union.“ For future reference, this article corresponds to Ar-
ticle 44 (2) g TEC and Article 54 (2) g EEC.
96 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM(2003) 284 fi nal, 21 May 2003.
97 The draft proposal of the 14th Company Law Directive is unfortunately not available 
anymore at the Commission’s website.
98 Vossestein, G., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 54.
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consultations which showed public support for the directive throughout 2003 
to 200699 suddenly on 28 June 2007 Commission decided to put the 14th 
Company Law Directive on hold.100 Shortly after being put on hold, the idea 
of the 14th Company Law Directive was abandoned on 3 October 2007.101 The 
main reasons being “political feasibility”, “lack of an economic case” and “the 
forthcoming ECJ’s ruling”.102 
99 Vossestein, G., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 53; Company law: Commission consults on the cross-
border transfer of companies’ registered offi ces of 26 February 2004, IP/04/270; Consulta-
tion on future priorities for the Action Plan on modernizing company law and enhancing 
corporate governance in the European Union of 20 December 2005 (http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/docs/consultation/consultation_en.pdf, visited 10.9.2010.).
100 To that effect Commissioner for Internal Market Charlie McCreevy stated: “But there 
are also some unresolved issues concerning the cross-border transfer of a company’s seat 
and stakeholders seek more legal certainty in that respect. The Commission had envis-
aged submitting a proposal for a directive this year. However, our preparatory work has 
led me to the conclusion that we should not rush forward with legislation. If we are to 
propose legislation, we must be sure there is a reasonable chance of a result with added 
value for business. The economic case is not as obvious or as clear-cut as it may seem 
and Member States currently follow very different approaches to which they are strongly 
attached. Moreover, the Court of Justice will soon take a decision in a case that could 
provide us with new insights on the current legal situation in Europe. As you know, the 
Court has already in the past delivered fundamental judgments in the area of company 
mobility. I am therefore convinced that we should wait for the outcome of this case 
which is likely to bring more clarity into this complicated matter. We expect the judg-
ment to be delivered in the autumn of this year.” (SPEECH/07/441 of 28 June 2007).
101 “The Commission had also suggested that a further means of improving mobility might 
be a directive stipulating the conditions for transfer of registered offi ce in the EU (the 
so-called “14th Company Law” directive). As I informed the European Parliament, in 
reply to the oral question tabled by Mr Gargani, the results of the economic analysis of 
the possible added value of a directive were inconclusive. Companies already have legal 
means to effectuate cross-border transfer. Several companies have already transferred 
their registered offi ce, using the possibilities offered by the European Company Statute. 
Soon the Cross-border Merger directive, which will enter into force in December, will 
give all limited liability companies, including SMEs, the option to transfer registered 
offi ce. They could do so by setting up a subsidiary in the Member State to which they 
want to move and then merging the existing company into this subsidiary. To my mind it 
is only if this framework is found wanting, that further legislative action in the shape of 
a 14th Company Law directive would be justifi ed. Therefore, I have decided not to pro-
ceed with the 14th Company Law Directive.“ (SPEECH/07/592 of 3 October 2007).
102 Vossestein, G., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 58.
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The fi rst reason, political feasibility, concerned the varied approach of Mem-
ber States in regard to corporate mobility. This reason should not be deemed as 
valid as it represents a reality of Community and its varying Member States, 
a reality that should be dealt with, either through the means of directive as 
discussed here or through other means (convention, regulation, recommenda-
tion).103 Therefore, reason of “political feasibility should not be an excuse for 
inactivity when such activity is required. The lack of economic case is based 
on the argument that companies already “have legal means to effectuate cross-
border transfer” like the possibility offered by the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), 
OJ 2001 L 294 (hereinafter: SE Regulation)  and the Directive 2005/56/CE of 
the Parliament and the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers 
of limited liability companies, OJ [2005] L 310/1 (hereinafter: Cross-border 
Merger Directive). However, none of these alternatives provide for an effective 
means of corporate mobility within the Community.104 Directive in this fi eld 
103 By means of convention based on Article 293 (3) TEC which provides that: “Member 
States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to 
securing for the benefi t of their nationals: … — the mutual recognition of companies or 
fi rms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal per-
sonality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibil-
ity of mergers between companies or fi rms governed by the laws of different countries,…”. 
Although this article was repealed from the TFEU text it does not stop Member States 
from regulating this matter through a convention. However, convention represents the 
most burdensome instrument since it has to be ratifi ed by all the signees. The best example 
is the failed 1968 Convention on Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons. 
Furthermore, the regulation provides for an overly rigid legal structure that has to be fol-
lowed by varying Member States and recommendation being of only advisory character to 
the Member States; Rammeloo, S., op. cit. in fn. 41., p. 372. 
104 Foremost these regulations are applicable and tailor made for specifi c Community entity 
(i.e. European Company) and not for Member State national company forms. Not-
withstanding, in regard to SE Regulation a company would fi rst have to transform into 
one of these Community entities. For example, transformation of limited company into 
European Company cannot take place before two years have elapsed since that limited 
company has had a subsidiary company established in another Member State. (Article 2 
(4) SE Regulation, Article 37 SE Regulation). After transformation European Company 
can transfer its seat to the host Member State. However, regulation mandates that such 
transfer must include both the transfer of the registered seat and the administrative seat. 
(Article 7 SE). After transferring, transferred European Company can again transform 
into intended company legal form recognized by the law of the host Member State. 
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would lessen the costs associated with setting up of European Company for 
the transfer or that of facilitating a cross-border merger.105 Moreover, it would 
surely provide for a more simplifi ed procedure than the one required by the 
European Company and the Cross-border Merger Directive.106 Consequently, 
Commission’s argument of lack of economic case could hardly live up to the 
stated contrary arguments. Finally, the Commission’s last argument of “the 
forthcoming ECJ’s ruling” referred to CARTESIO. Notwithstanding, the direc-
tive is still needed. First of all, if corporate mobility would be resolved through 
a directive it would provide for a more unifying and comprehensive Community 
level instrument than the one that was to be facilitated through the ECJ’s case 
(Article 66 SE). This lengthy three step process which includes two transformations and 
demands transfer of both the registered and the administrative seat does not provide for 
a practical solution which would ensure adequate level of corporate mobility between 
Member States. Furthermore, existing Community law permits for another possibility fa-
cilitated by the Cross-border Merger Directive. Specifi cally, this directive enables a cross-
border vertical reverse merger. Cross-border vertical reverse merger is a merger through 
which a subsidiary company merges with its parent company, i.e. subsidiary company 
absorbs its parent company and the parent company ceases to exist (Bohrenkämper, J., 
op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 89.). This two step mechanism requires incorporation of a new com-
pany in the host Member State and undertaking of subsequent merger. Unlike the above 
mentioned possibility by the SE Regulation, this merger mechanism does not necessarily 
require a considerable amount of time. However, the length of this process would largely 
depend upon the overall effi ciency and business friendly attitude of both the competent 
home Member State and host Member State courts. In addition, this means that each 
of the companies involved in the merger would have to comply with the provisions of its 
own lex societatis (e.g. decision making process) which might prove in some cases quite 
burdensome (Vossestein, G., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 60; see as well Article 4 Cross-border 
Merger Directive which provides for some quite burdensome requirements that must be 
satisfi ed by the merging companies). Since the goal of Community as a one single mar-
ket is to ensure a unifi ed legal area where legal entities are not restricted in undertaking 
their business activities our position is that neither the proposed merger mechanism nor 
the SE mechanism could effectively accomplish this goal. In other words, Community 
entrepreneurs require a one step cross-border transfer of company seat mechanism that 
will allow them to transfer their business in the simplest manner possible from the legal 
jurisdiction of their initial home Member State to the legal jurisdiction of the new host 
Member State.
105 Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory group on Corporate Governance and Com-
pany Law held on 4 April 2007, p. 5 (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/advi-
sory/index_en.htm, visited 10.9.2010.).
106 Vossestein, G., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 60. 
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law. That is because if corporate mobility is to be facilitated by the ECJ through 
its case law, it means that it is to be generally undertaken on a case to case 
basis.107 On the other hand, it would as well provide for a more coherent and 
generally applicable instrument in all of the Member States, unlike the “case 
to case” approach facilitated by the ECJ.108 Furthermore, at the current state 
of Community law there is a certain level of regulatory competition ongoing 
between the Member States. After INSPIRE ART it was clear that companies 
incorporated in Member State grounded in the registered seat theory (e.g. UK) 
could freely undertake their business activities or even transfer their adminis-
trative seat to another Member State grounded in the real seat theory without 
fear of being denied such activities by the host Member State.109 This enabled 
UK to play the role of “…European Delaware, being the State offering the 
most attractive, in this case, the cheapest incorporation service while offering 
a well developed and very fl exible legal regime.”.110 This resulted in situations 
107 Wyckaert, M., Jenné, F., op. cit. in fn. 7., p. 29 - 30.
108 For example, due to a Cross-border Merger Directive and ECJ’s preceding ruling in SE-
VIC that concerned a Community cross-border merger situation. SEVIC already enabled 
companies to initiate cross-border mergers without the directive. However, such case law 
approach was afterwards replaced by a more coherent directive. This demonstrates that 
ECJ cannot provide for a required level of legal certainty unlike for example a directive in 
that fi eld; Vossestein, G., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 61; Lennarts, M., Company mobility within 
the EU, fi fty years on from a non-issue to a hot topic, Utrecht Law Review 4 (2008) 1, p. 
2; Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 620 - 621.
109 In INSPIRE ART the court provided that: “That being so, as the Court confi rmed in 
paragraph 27 of Centros, the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set 
up a company can choose to do so in the Member State the company-law rules of which 
seem to him the least restrictive and then set up branches in other Member States is in-
herent in the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by 
the Treaty.” (INSPIRE ART, para. 138). It continued by stating: “In addition, it is clear 
from settled case-law (Segers, paragraph 16, and Centros, paragraph 29) that the fact 
that a company does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its 
registered offi ce and pursues its activities only or principally in the Member State where 
its branch is established is not suffi cient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent 
conduct which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the benefi t 
of the provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment.” (INSPIRE 
ART, para. 139; Lennarts, M., op. cit. in fn. 108., p. 2). 
110 Wymeersch, E., op. cit. in fn. 40., p. 164; After CENTROS a number of Ltd. companies 
in the UK increased from 4400 initially registered companies to 28,000 registered com-
panies. These companies only represent a number of companies that do not conduct any 
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where businessmen (mostly small enterprises) established their companies in 
the UK and then transferred their business back to the Member State of their 
business interest (usually the Member State grounded in the real seat theory 
like Germany) thus avoiding burdensome company law of that Member State. 
As a consequence, both Member States grounded in the real seat theory and 
in the registered seat theory recognized the danger of losing investment and 
consequently initiated reforms of their respective company laws in order to 
make them more attractive to investors that are shopping for the most suitable 
Member State of incorporation.111 The question poses itself, is such competition 
where company law standards are being tailored in order to attract investment 
good for the creditors, minority shareholders or the company employees? One 
thing is certain, a directive in this fi eld would strike the best possible uniform 
balance between the interests of the investors on one side and the protection 
of company’s creditors, minority shareholders and employees on the other. 
Moreover, not all Member States hold equal ground in regard to this ongoing 
regulatory competition. Member States grounded in the registered seat theory 
are actively participating in such regulatory competition while the real seat 
theory Member States are forced to passively monitor the number of compa-
business activity within the UK but are solely incorporated for the purpose of conducting 
all of their business activities in another Member State (usually Germany and France); de 
Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., fn. 84; Johnston, A., op. cit. in fn. 26., p. 396.
111 For example, France has reduced the minimum capital requirement to 1 EUR for its 
Société à Responsibilité Limitée (Private Limited Company) (Wymeersch, E., op. cit. in fn. 
40., p. 164; de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., fn. 85; Johnston, A., op. cit. in fn. 26., p. 
397).  Furthermore, in Germany two expert committees were formed in 2003 under the 
Deutsche Rat für Internationales Privatrecht that made a legislative proposal on cross-border 
seat transfer both from the European and the national position (Rammeloo, S., op. cit. 
in fn. 41., p. 373 - 374; Wisniewski, A., Opalski, A., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 622). Eventually, 
in 2008 German authorities as well commenced procedure on adopting a law that would 
result in abandoning the real seat theory and adoption of the registered seat theory. In 
addition, Portugal has also reformed its law in order to facilitate transfer of company’s 
seat (de Sousa, A. F., op. cit. in fn. 2., p. 10). In 2007 Hungary as well changed its legis-
lation thus enabling companies to transfer their administrative seat to another Member 
State while remaining incorporated under Hungarian law (Cerioni, L., op. cit. in fn. 68., 
text following fn. 15; Deak, D., op. cit. in fn. 87., p. 251). Finally, the discussion on en-
abling companies to transfer their registered seat to another Member State (something 
that is currently not permitted under competent UK company laws) was also initiated 
in the UK (Johnston, A., op. cit. in fn. 26., p. 400). 
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nies that are leaving their jurisdiction or reform their respective national laws 
in order to facilitate a registered seat theory framework. Therefore, in order to 
provide equal opportunity to both the real seat Member States and the registered 
seat Member States a uniform regulation applicable within the Community 
is needed. Consequently, revival of Commission’s work on the 14th Company 
Law Directive would be more than welcome.112 
VIII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was only to provide an outline of the issue of corpo-
rate mobility within the Community. To that effect, we have provided a brief 
introduction to corporate mobility within the general context of confl ict of laws, 
differences between the two diverging theories that relate to determination of 
lex societatis and ultimately to corporate mobility within the context of Com-
munity law. It can be concluded that there are still many practical corporate 
mobility issues both from the position of the general confl ict of laws and more 
specifi cally from the Community law context. In fi nal part of this paper we 
also relate to, in our view, unjustifi ably abandoned work on the 14th Company 
Law Directive on the transfer of company’s registered seat. Our assertion is 
that companies should be able to transfer both their registered seat as well as 
their administrative seat between Member States notwithstanding restrictions 
imposed either by the home Member States or the host Member State. In other 
words, freedom of establishment should be construed as a two-fold right and 
thus it should enable companies established within the Community to freely 
conduct their business operations (including the possibility to transfer their 
company seat) anywhere within the Community. Therefore, since Community 
law at the current stage of development (especially considering the relevant 
ECJ case law like CARTESIO) does not entitle companies with such rights, 
restoration of work on the abandoned 14th Company Law Directive is more 
than required. Currently, only such a uniform Community wide instrument 
112 In that regard there have been certain incentives given by the European Parliament. Name-
ly, on 10 March 2009 European Parliament adopted a resolution calling Commission to 
resume work on the 14th Company Law Directive. (European Parliament resolution of 
10 March 2009 with recommendations to the Commission on the cross-border transfer 
of the registered offi ce of a company (2008/2196(INI), P6_TA-PROV(2009)0086 (not 
published)).
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PRAVO POSLOVNOG NASTANA I KORPORATIVNA MOBILNOST 
- PREGLED KLJU»NIH PITANJA
U radu se daju temeljne naznake otvorenih pitanja mobilnosti trgovaËkih druπtava, 
kako s aspekta pravila meunarodnog privatnog prava, a tako i uvaæavajuÊi pravila 
prava EU. Za potonje je najvaænije pravo na ostvarivanje poslovnog nastana, kao dio 
primarnog prava EU. Miπljenje je autora da je za puno ostvarivanje prava poslovnog 
nastana prijeko potrebno da druπtva mogu ne samo obavljati svoju djelatnost gdje god 
æele, nego i promijenjati svoje sjediπte, ako to odgovara potrebama njihovoga poslovanja, 
naravno pod uvjetom da to znaËi koriπtenje sloboda ustanovljenih pravom EU, a ne da 
znaËi zlouporabu tih sloboda. Ma kakav god stav da se zauzme o aktualnom stanju prava 
EU po tome pitanju, odnosno da li ono omoguÊava punu realizaciju prava poslovnog 
nastana ili ne, Ëini se da bi bilo vrlo korisno radi pravne sigurnosti da se donese poseban 
pravni instrument, koji bi uredio moguÊnost promjene sjediπta druπtva iz jedne dræave 
Ëlanice u drugu. U tome bi smislu bilo potrebno nastaviti prekinuti rad na 14. direktivi 
prava druπtava o prijenosu registriranoga sjediπta.  
KljuËne rijeËi: pravo poslovnog nastana, sjediπte tvrtke, prijenos sjediπta, prekograniËni 
prijenos sjediπta, lex societatis
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